FIG. 1. Fare arbitrage scenario involving two commuters with overlapping paths. One commuter is going from station A to C while the other one is going from B to D.
Metrorail. If one individual is traveling from Vienna/Fairfax station to Metro Center station on the Orange line and another individual is traveling from Rosslyn station to New Carrollton station on the same train then during peak hours they pay $5.3 and $4.9. But if the travelers decide to swap tickets they pay $5.75 and $2.1 instead. So the saving is $2.35 or 23% of total trip cost.
In the following sections we discuss general conditions for arbitrage and how those are reflected in real systems like BART.
GENERALIZATION
In this paper we use the phrase fare arbitrage as the scenario where two individuals traveling separately have overlapping routes and may agree to exchange tickets to decrease the total price of their trips. Higher order arbitrage where more than two travelers decide to exchange tickets is not considered here.
Fig 1 shows a transit route from station A to D via stations B and C. Suppose one traveler is going from station A to C while another traveler is going from station B to D. Between stations B and C both travelers are on the same train. If they choose to swap tickets the transit system will see one traveler going from station A to D while another from B to C. If the total price of latter two tickets is less than the actual trips then there is fare arbitrage.
The reverse case could also be true -if two travelers going from A to D and B to C respectively have to pay higher price than A to C and B to D then arbitrage becomes possible. One simple pricing method that is quite common is to have a fixed fare for all trips. Large transit systems such as New York City and Chicago have such flat rates. Although this method eliminates fare arbitrage, it may only be feasible for a city with a large population, high density and high fraction of citizens using the service for daily commute.
Another common strategy is to use a price proportional to distance traveled. This fair pricing model is showed as the grey line in fig 2. San Francisco Bay Area CalTrain system breaks up the route into zones and uses prices that are proportional to the number of zones traveled. Like the flat rate method, this pricing strategy also eliminates fare arbitrage. But it may not be optimal for revenue maximization if the transit system is complex and population density is non-uniform. It may also not be ideal if policy makers wish to change population density by encouraging people to move closer to city center or farther out.
Going back to the example in fig 1 let us assume that the individual going from station A to C is traveling distance x while the individual going from station B to D is traveling distance y. Suppose y > x and d = y − x. Let us assume f (.) is the fare as a function of distance. We can express the arbitrage condition as follows.
and our two travelers swap their tickets during their trip, they get a discount worth In fig 2 the blue curve is above the fair grey line. This implies short distances are penalized to maxmize transit revenue. If the blue line had the same concave shape but were below the grey line then short distances are fair but long distances are subsidized. The Richmond-Fremont route fares from Richmond are shown in fig 6. The bump corresponding to Oakland is smaller and fare is linear beyond Oakland. There is another tiny convex section near the end of the route.
Although arbitrage condition, as laid out earlier, is true for the concave bumps in fig 5 and fig 6, actual arbitrage becomes possible for one more reason -price asymmetry. Fares from different stations even on the same route are different and unless these are carefully aligned it would be possible to pay less by swapping tickets. Table II shows a sample of pairs of routes where fare arbitrage is possible. The first two rows in table II are due to the higher price commuters have to pay when they travel from San Francisco to Oakland compared to commuters who have started outside San Francisco and already paid a high price to enter the city. Someone going from San Francisco airport to Embarcadero can swap tickets with someone from Balboa Park and leverage the lower price to cross into Oakland.
The last two rows in table II Computing such pairs involves exhaustively finding overlapping paths between trips where the cost would be lower. Given that transit graphs are often spanning trees, even a brute force solution has complexity O(n 5 ) where n is the number of stations in the system. For BART n = 44 and computation finishes in under a minute on a laptop. Source code, input and output data is available at github.com/asifhaque/transit-arbitrage If BART authorities release anonymized data of every trip for users traveling through the system it would be very interesting to compute the total amount in dollars that San Francisco Bay Area commuters can save every day.
It would be interesting to explore Washington DC Metrorail in detail as well. Since it is a larger system with peak and offpeak rates, arbitrage strategies could be more complicated. Preliminary investigation exposes possibility of arbitrage. 5). There is another steep part leading to DC city center around station 10. Heading out towards the suburbs prices are essentially flat for commuters coming all the way.
DIRECTIONS
In this paper we have explored basics of transit fare arbitrage and analyzed BART fare structure both qualitatively and quantitatively via exhaustive computation. Our study highlights the need for careful design of pricing models for transit systems.
One interesting direction that might lead to an efficient fare system is if tickets are all electronic, ideally via a smartphone app, that third parties can manage to optimize inidividual trips. In recent years BART has moved from paper tickets towards Clipper Cards (NFC tags). Data is encrypted on these cards and can be read by any NFC reader but not written to except for BART machines. If in future we start using smartphone NFC capabilites (Google Wallet for example) and allow third parties to dynamically swap account profile on the smartphone app then arbitrage will be technically very easy. It may even allow arbitrage between routes that do not have overlapping paths and ultimately force the prices to be arbitrage free and thus efficient. We can imagine companies like Uber and Lyft managing such apps to provide commuters with a uniform payment interface encompassing ride shares and mass transit.
